BitShares Block Production Incident Report

approved and published on 07/11/2017

On Monday, July 10th 2017 at 9:00am UTC, an incident occurred on the BitShares network that caused an unplanned interruption of block production. All block producers have been affected by a memory corruption that was caused by an automatic resize of a flat_index container that resulted in an unrecoverable stale state. This has happened for the first time in over two years of blockchain operations.

After several core developers debugging the code, the cause was identified and a patch was quickly delivered to the block producers. Shortly after that, the blockchain recovered and new blocks have been generated.

All transaction that made it into the blockchain prior to this incident are unaltered!

It is absolutely necessary that everyone is aware that the nature of the patch requires all nodes to apply the patch, accordingly, in order to sync back with the blockchain. We recommend exchanges and third party providers to update their back-end to tag 2.0.170710 and rebuild. The following steps facilitate this update:

git fetch
git checkout 2.0.170710
git submodule update --init --recursive


The BitShares Blockchain Foundation would like to thank the core developers for their short response time and for resolving the issue in a timely manner.

Announcement Mailing List

In order to improve responsiveness, the BitShares Blockchain Foundation has set up several mailing lists including a low noise critical and an announcement list that we recommend fundamental industry partners (like exchanges and money transmitting partners) to subscribe to. This will enable all businesses in the BitShares network to be aware of all latest developments.

Technical Description and Patch Description

The incident caused the block production to halt due to bitasset data for the GAS asset (2.4.0) returning an object id 0.0.0. This error was triggered during a maintenance interval and threw an assertion that prevented block producers from producing blocks. Since object ids are supposed to not change, this has lead the BitShares developers to believe that a memory corruption caused the assertion.

While attempting to identify the cause of the memory corruption, Daniel Larimer gave the crucial hint about the potential of a flat_index container corrupting the memory on a resize.

A simple five line patch replacing the flat_index container with a generic_index container solved the memory corruption and thus the block production issue. Going forward, all use of flat_index is revisited and a general replacement by generic_index will be evaluated and tested.

Update - Wed Jul 12

As it turned out after further investigation, the root cause was an inappropriate implementation of flat_index::remove that only zeroed an entry instead of removing the whole element from the container. What happens is that a new bitasset has been proposed but the proposal wasn’t fully approved. The bitasset data was created in the database and then zeroed instead of being removed after expiration of the proposal. This is the first time in the history of our chain when flat_index::remove was called.

The conclusion is that flat_index is not made for having items removed. Proposals can always lead to items being removed, which means that flat_index is not suitable for the job and should be replaced in all places.

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